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Introduction
Mathematicians posited that a “butterfly effect”1 might be 
present  in  complex  interactions.   Relationships  between 
Power Transition in Europe, the future of European Union’s 
(EU)  Common  Foreign  and  Security  Policy  (CFSP),  and 
protracted  Cyprus  conflict  are  examples  of  this 
phenomenon.  On  the  one  hand,  findings  from  Power 
Transition analysis indicate significant shift  in global  and 
regional hierarchies where the EU is expected to fall behind 
its global competitions –namely China, the United States, 
and  India  (Tammen  et  al,  2000;  Yesilada,  Efird,  and 
Noordijk  2006).   On  the  other  hand,  closer  this  “rising 
threat of China” can be postponed by a deeper degree of 
cooperation  between  the  US  and  US,  which  includes 
economic  and  security  integration  (i.e.,  EU-NATO 
partnership  in  CFSP).   Yet,  this  desired  deepening  of 
security ties between Transatlantic Allies depends on how 
EU-Turkey relations evolve which, in turn, is partially held 
hostage by the Cyprus problem. All this represents nothing 
short of a big headache for policy makers of Western allies. 
Therefore, the implications of a continuation of the status 
quo in Cyprus go far beyond what most observers assume 
–  Greek-Turkish  relations.  Settling  the  Cyprus  problem 
might  be  desirable  in  and  of  itself,  but  analysis  in  this 
paper demonstrates that the unforeseen consequences of 
a failure to solve this problem goes far beyond its borders, 
affecting  future  of  the  EU  in  its  competition  with  other 
world powers beyond 2050. 
Global Power Transition and the Future of EU
Power  Transition  theory  provides  insight  into  rise  and 
decline of states on global as well as regional hierarchies 
and the model utilized lets us estimate the probability of 
cooperation and conflict between any two countries in their 
respective  hierarchies.2 The  model  utilized  is  based  on 
1 The butterfly proposal originally comes from Edward Lorenz’s findings that even the 
tiny disturbance by a single butterfly might be enough to alter the patters of weather all 
over the world. This phenomenon exemplifies the notion of sensitive dependence on 
initial conditions in a dynamic system.  In other words, small changes of the original 
condition may produce unpredictably large variations in the long term outcome.   
2 For further reading on Power Transition see A.F.K. Organski, World Politics, 1st edition. 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958), A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler. The War Ledger. 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980) and Ron Tammen, et al. Power Transitions: 
Strategies for the 21st Century, Revised Chinese edition. Chatham: Chatham House (now 
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A.F.K.  Organski’s  work  in  world  politics.  Brian  Efird  and 
Gaspare  Genna (2003)  extended the  theory  and  argued 
that the development of regional integration after a power 
transition between two satisfied powers improves because 
the formerly less powerful country has a vital interest in 
not  only  maintaining  but  also  furthering  and 
institutionalizing the arrangements that it believes to have 
contributed to its rise.
When  examined  from  a  power  transition  perspective, 
competition between the EU, China, India (in 20-30 years), 
and  the  US  does  not  look  favorably  for  the  Europeans. 
Figure 1 show simulation results for power transition in the 
first half of the 21st Century and is an updated analysis of 
previous  study  by  Yesilada,  Efird,  and  Noordijk.   The 
position  of  the bubble  in  this  figure  represents  share  of 
system  productivity  for  each  major  power  (the  Y-axis) 
against  time (the  X-axis).   The size  of  each bubbles  as 
represents  “Productivity  per  capita”  measured  in 
purchasing power parity.
Figure  1:   Forecasting  GDP  Shares  and  GDP  Per  Capita  for   
Global Competitors: 2000-2050 
(The  size  of  the  bubble  represents  per  capita  productivity 
measured in purchasing power parity [ppp])
C.Q. Press, 2004).
4
Birol A. Yeşilada
As these results demonstrate, recent enlargement of the 
EU is not likely to reverse its decline on global hierarchy 
even  though  the  Europeans  will  maintain  significant 
advantage  over  China  and  India  in  terms  of  per  capita 
productivity.  In an attempt to test how Turkey’s potential 
membership would affect this picture, the above simulation 
is repeated with Turkey included as a EU member in 2020. 
Moreover, Croatia is also added to simply reflect expected 
membership of this country in 2012 although its economic 
impact  on  EU’s  competitiveness  is  not  expected  to  be 
significant.  Results are shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2:   Forecasting GDP Shares and GDP Per Capita for EU   
plus Turkey versus Global Competitors
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In the scenario where Turkey joins the EU, its contribution 
becomes apparent  by 2040,  and the decline in the EU’s 
share of global gross domestic product (GDP) levels off at 
around 10 percent  and begins  to  show a slow increase. 
Implications  of  these  results  for  integration,  future 
enlargement, and policy making are clear. Based on these 
observations, it is clear that it is in EU’s interest to include 
Turkey among its ranks if  the European leaders want to 
position  the  Union  in  a  favorable  position  for  future 
competitiveness with China, India, and the United States. 
Another dimension of Power Transition analysis is how well 
the  model  predicts  probability  of  conflict  or 
cooperation/integration  between  two  states.3  The 
3 Efird (2000, Efird et.al. 2002) argued that the following relationship captures the 
dynamics of the possibilities for conflict and cooperation in the international system:
( ) Dc HHRPSRPCI ++−= 3   
Where;
CI = Conflict - Integration
RP = Relative Power
S = Status Quo 
Hc = Hierarchy of Challenger
HD = Hierarchy of Defender
Equation represents a dominated hierarchy where satisfaction prevails and a uniform 
hierarchy where anarchy prevails. First when relative power is at parity the severity of 
conflict is maximized because both sides anticipate an equal probability of success. 
Formal work on the median voter theory indicates that this insight is consistent with 
rational expectations. Indeed, as Black anticipated, when two candidates with opposing 
points of view enter an election they will attempt to reach the median first-- assuring 
them of victory. Contested elections are those where the outcome is unclear – i.e. the 
last two Presidential elections in the US. Moreover, when parity is approached and policy 
differences are fundamental, tempers flare and electoral conflicts escalate to direct 
confrontations.  The same process takes place in world politics. When nations are 
satisfied with international norms (S>0) the cubed RP term shifts the highest propensity 
for conflict past the parity point. Thus, greater asymmetry improves the likelihood of 
cooperation assuming that the dyad is at least somewhat jointly satisfied, especially 
when dyads are highly asymmetric. Further, Organski and Kugler (1980:59) found that 
the dissatisfied challenger initiates conflict in the post-transition period pointing to a 
cubed RP term. Such results proved again to be consistent with later formal proofs. 
Kugler and Zagare (1986), Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992), Alsharabati (1997) 
show game theoretically that the defender does not preempt at preponderance because 
it values the status quo and prefers to postpone action. On the other hand, the 
dissatisfied challenger is willing to wage war since the highest likelihood of success is 
anticipated after the transition point. The relationship between power and satisfaction is 
also consistent with expectations. The more dissatisfied the challenger the more likely 
that war will occur during a power transition. At the extreme, when nations are 
completely dissatisfied (when S=0), the challenger desire to initiate conflict increases 
with every improvement in relative power and maximizes just past parity. Thus, the 
increasing likelihood of capitalizing on the growing opportunity to redress grievances 
imposed by the defender is accelerated by anticipation of changes in relative power. 
Conflict can take place under asymmetry – as the Al Qaeda attack indicates – but the 
severity of such conflict will be limited. The interactive term allows a differentiation 
between the probability of conflict and the severity of such an encounter and allows us 
to reconcile some seemingly important discrepancies.  The model accounts for the 
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simulation results for EU-Turkey relations, shown in Figure 
3, indicate no conflict is likely in this dyad. However, the 
results  also  hint  at  that  this  relationship  will  gradually 
move from its current integration level to more of a neutral 
one in foreseeable future.  This is consistent with current 
reality. Turkey and the EU already have a customs union 
agreement with increasing bilateral trade and investment 
between their economies.  Therefore, it is highly probable 
that  integration  based  on  CU  will  proceed  forward  but 
further deepening of integration (i.e. moving to a Common 
Market or Economic and Monetary Union) would not be in 
the  picture  given  the  nature  of  worsening  relations 
between the two parties.  
Figure  3:   Forecasting  Conflict-Cooperation  for  EU-Turkey,   
2000-2050
seeming contradiction that the Seven Weeks’ War between Austria and Prussia occurred 
at parity when both nations were satisfied (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992). The 
equation shows that the probability of conflict under parity is high, thus the conflict, but 
the structural constraints imposed by satisfaction kept the severity of that war limited. 
Thus, like in elections, two satisfied nations may wage a war of low severity, but under 
similar circumstances two dissatisfied nations will wage total war.
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Despite these result and personal desire of some European 
leaders to put a wide distance between the EU and Turkey, 
this  country’s  pivotal  role  in  determining  the  future 
competition between global giants remains valid.
Power Transition and CFSP
Whereas  the  importance  of  closer  economic  integration 
between  the  EU  and  Turkey  is  obvious  from  power 
transition perspective, implication of Turkish membership 
for CFSP and Transatlantic partnership is often overlooked. 
Since Cyprus joined the EU, the Cyprus problem became an 
added obstacle in achieving an optimum solution for EU-
NATO  partnership.   Of  course,  prior  to  Cyprus’s 
membership this partnership became hostage of EU-Turkey 
membership deliberations – each time an EU member state 
raised  objections  to  Turkey’s  candidacy  or  now 
membership, Turkey in turn showed its veto power in NATO 
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over EU’s access to the Alliance’s integrated infrastructure.
4
Significance of NATO for CFSP
EU’s CFSP is a crucial achievement for regional integration 
for  it  demonstrates to the world that the Union is not a 
mere economic enterprise and aims to place Europe as a 
global power in every respect of that term.  According to 
Wolfgand Wessels and Franziska Bopp (2008:1): 
The  provisions  for  CFSP  and,  increasingly  also  the 
Common  Security  and  Defence  Policy  (CSDP), can  be 
regarded  as  the  cornerstone  of  the  Lisbon  Treaty. 
Furthermore, the challenges the Union faces within the 
international system are ever growing and requiring an 
ever-increasing  scope  of  action  across  different  policy 
fields, geographical regions and arenas of policy-making. 
This  makes  the  policy  field  a  very  relevant,  although 
sometimes  diffusing  research  area  as  three  types  of 
foreign  interactions  intertwine:  traditional  national 
foreign policy, the foreign policy of the EU as prescribed 
in  the  treaty  articles  on  CFSP  and  CSDP,  and  the  EC 
external  relations,  which  concentrate  on  long-standing 
and mostly economic foreign relations and development 
policy. 
As a result of the Lisbon Treaty, CFSP became embedded 
in a whole range of other EU policies that have implications 
for  external  action  by  member  states.  Lisbon  Treaty 
elevated European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) to a 
Common  Security  and  Defense  Policy  (CSDP,  while  still 
being  within  CFSP)  and  made  it  clear  that  this  change 
indicates  a  greater  willingness  by  member  states  to 
develop a “military arm” of the EU – yet without a greater 
4 There are numerous works written about ESDP-Turkey relations within the context of 
Atlantic relations as well as regional stability in the Eastern Mediterranean/Greater 
Middle East.  For example see Josef Alt, “The Future of the Euroepan Security and 
Defence Policy,” (Maxwell, AL: Research Report Air Command and Staff College, 2006), 
Mahmut Aykan “Turkey and European Security and Defence Identity/Policy (ESDI/P): A 
Turkish View.” Journal of Contemporary European studies, Vol. Volume 13, Issue 3, 
(2005): 335 – 359; Hüseyin Bağcı, “Türkiye ve AGSK: Beklentiler, Endişeler,” [ Turkey and 
ESDP] in İdris. Bal, ed., Yüzyılın Eşiğinde Türk Dış Politikası {Turkish Foreign Policy at the 
Start of the 21st Century] (Istanbul: Alfa Basım, 2001);  Katinka Barysch, “Turkey’s Role in 
European Energy Security,” Center for European Security Essyas, (December, 2007); 
Atila Eralp, “European Security and Turkey,” Private View, Vol. 9, (Spring 2000); 52-55; 
Giovanni Gasparini, ed., Turkey and European Security, (Rome: Istituto Affari 
Internazionali for IAI-TESEV Report, 2007); Charles Grant, Europe’s Blurred Boundaries: 
Rethinking enlargement and neighborbood policy, (London: Center for European Reform, 
2006);  Charles Grant, “Turkey offers EU more punch,” Center for European Reform 
Commnet and Analysis, (Published by European Voice, September, 1-7, 2005); Kemal 
Kirişçi, Turkey;’s foreign policy in turbulent times, Chaillot Paper no. 92 (Paris: Institute 
for Security Studies, 2006); and Çınar Özen, “ESDP-NATO Relations: Considerations on 
the Future of European Security Architecture,” The Turkish Yearbook of International  
Affairs,  Vol XXXIII, (2002):231-255.
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push for  a more a supranational  approach. Reference to 
partnership  with  NATO  as  the  foundation  of  member 
states’  security  policy  (for  those  who  are  members  of 
NATO) is proof of intergovernmentalist approach to CSDP. 
This is apparent in upholding of Article 17 of the Treaty of 
the European Union by the Lisbon Treaty (ToL, Art.  28A, 
par.  2)  reasserting  “progressive  framing  of  a  common 
Union defense policy will lead to a common defense, when 
the  European  Council,  acting  unanimously,  so  decides.” 
While  CFSP  remains  intergovernmental  in  nature,  some 
member states like France see it as a way of setting up EU 
as a superpower to balance the power of the United States. 
However,  many other members  like the United Kingdom 
see it as a way to improve partnership between the EU and 
US  in  a  mutually  beneficial  cooperation  and  support  in 
security affairs. What is clear from recent developments is 
that  the  CFSP  sees  NATO  for  being  responsible  for 
territorial defense of active in the latter policy area with its 
“soft power” and security related training missions. The EU 
has sent peacekeeping missions to several of the world’s 
trouble spots. In August 2008, the EU brokered a ceasefire 
to end fighting between Georgia and Russia and deployed 
EU  observers  to  monitor  the  situation.  It  provided 
humanitarian aid to people displaced by the fighting and 
organized an international  donor conference for  Georgia. 
The EU also has a leading role in the Balkans, where it is 
funding assistance projects in seven countries to help them 
build stable societies. In Kosovo, the EU deployed a 1,900-
strong justice and police force in December 2008 to help 
ensure  law  and  order.  In  most,  if  not  all,  of  these 
operations EU relied on assistance of NATO in one way or 
another.  Thus,  the phrase “separable,  but  not  separate” 
describes  the  current  partnership  between  CSDP  and 
NATO.5 Since the enlargement of NATO and the European 
Union in 2004 and the accession of Bulgaria and Romania 
to the European Union in 2007, the organizations have 21 
member countries in common (See Map 1).
Map 1:  EU-NATO Countries 
5 For a thorough discussion of this formulation see CDI Military Reform Project of the EU 
at http://www.cdi.org/mrp/eu.cfm). 
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   EU member only
   NATO member only
   member of both
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:EU_and_NATO.svg 
It is not surprising that the current partnership framework 
heavily  relies  on  NATO  capabilities,  more  precisely  on 
U.S.’s  heavy  lift  aircraft  and  advanced  spy  satellites,  in 
advancing CSDP of the Union. 
The reliance of CFSP on the U.S. becomes more clear when 
one considers future defense expenditures of these Allies. 
According to a report  by the  Financial  Times  (November 
17,  2010:9),  EU  suffers  not  only  from declining  defense 
expenditures  but also from heavy over duplication of  its 
members’ defense infrastructure.  Figure 4 shows defense 
expenditures for EU and US during 2001-2009.
Figure 4: EU-US Defense Expenditures
(€billion, real 2009 prices)
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source: Financial Times (November 17, 2010).
The  observed  trend  is  likely  to  get  worse  when  one 
considers  planned  defense  budget  cuts  among  NATO’s 
leading EU members:  Britain by 8 percent between now 
and 2015, Germany will  reduce its current €31b defense 
budget by €8.3b by 2014, Spain by 7 percent in response 
to its current budget deficit (Financial Times, November 17, 
2010:9).   Moreover, EU members duplicate their defense 
industries  to  such  an  extent  that  collective  efficiency  is 
nonexistent.  Strong intergovernmental approach to CFSP 
and CSDP assures  that  each member state continues to 
maintain national  defense industries  rather than figuring 
out  which  country  should  specialize  in  manufacturing  of 
which weapons systems.  Thus, when compared to the U.S. 
the  Europeans  look  pretty  inefficient  to  say  the  least. 
Currently the EU has 21 naval shipyards compared to 3 in 
the  US;  89  different  European  weapons  programs  as 
opposed to 27 American systems; Europe has 11 different 
tank productions while the U.S. has two (ibid.). This picture 
clearly shows that whereas CSDP is the ideal, reality on the 
ground is anything but “European.”  The bottom line is that 
until  EU members formulate an integrated and optimized 
defense  industries,  their  expenditures  in  this  area  will 
continue  to  be  inefficient  and  present  an  obstacle  in 
developing  costly  systems,  i.e.,  heavy  lift  capability 
aircraft,  that  would  reduce  Europe’s  dependence  on 
Americans.
EU  could  significantly  bolster  its  defense  capabilities  if 
Turkey were to become a member of the Union. However, 
given all the current problems surrounding this topic, how 
could  Transatlantic  Allies  find  a compromise position?  In 
other words,  would it  be possible or acceptable to bring 
Turkey into the ESDP prior to full membership in the EU? 
As Ceyhun Doğru (2009: 60) explains: 
“With  regard  to  military  arm  of  the  EU,  Turkey’s 
significant  input  is  important  due  to  its  military 
capabilities and military bases.  Turkey has the second 
largest army of NATO (after the US) and ranks fifth in 
12
Birol A. Yeşilada
terms of naval forces. The stability of the region where 
Turkey  is  located  is  of  vital  importance  to  European 
security  considerations.  Moreover,  its  former  and 
ongoing  contributions  to  ESDP  operations  as  well  as 
those of NATO and the UN demonstrate the political will 
to  take  part  in  internationals  peace  and  security 
endeavors. Despite knowing the fact that Turkey would 
never  enjoy  a  full-say  in  the  EU  concerning  ESDP 
operations,  it  endorses  those  activities  to  the  extent 
possible.  Turkey is the biggest contributor as a non-EU 
country – and even bigger than some EU members – to 
ESDP  operations  and  supports  further  security  co-
operation  in  order  to  assume  stability  in  the  region. 
Employment  of  logistic  and  material  capabilities  of 
Turkey will be in the interest of Europe. Bigger Turkish 
contribution could be approved by full implementation of 
already existing mechanisms.”
An additional contribution of Turkey’s membership to CSDP 
concerns EU’s energy security and regional stability in the 
area  stretching  from  the  Eastern  Mediterranean  to  the 
Caspian basin.   The latter topic  will  be covered in more 
detail  in  the  following  Chapter  when  benefits  and 
challenges of membership for Turkey will be analyzed.  For 
EU’s  energy  security  it  can  be  said  that,  once  more, 
Turkey’s location presents a major factor as it is a transit 
country  for  energy  networks  including  the  Baku-Ceyhan 
pipeline  and  the  Nabucco  pipeline.  As  the  Independent 
Commission on Turkey (2004: 19) reports: 
“The construction of the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline [and 
future Nabucco pipeline], following the emergence of the 
Caspian basin as one of the world’s largest sources of oil 
and natural gas highlights Turkey’s role as a key transit 
country  for  energy  supplies.  Moreover,  Turkey’s 
geopolitical position and close links with tens of millions 
of  Turkic  people  in  neighbouring  countries  could  help 
secure  European  access  to  the  enormous  wealth  of 
resources in Central Asia and regions of Siberia, making 
Turkey  a  vital  factor  for  Europe’s  security  of  energy 
supplies coming from the Middle East, the Caspian Sea 
and Russia. In this context, Turkey’s decisive importance 
for  the  water  supply  of  neighbouring  countries  in  the 
Middle East would be of considerable additional value.”
These pipelines represent a policy response to EU’s energy 
dependence on Russia and go a long way in diversifying 
energy  imports  of  the  Union.   The  Nabucco  project 
represents  a  new  gas  pipeline  connecting  the  Caspian 
region,  Middle  East  and  Egypt via  Turkey,  Bulgaria, 
Romania, and Hungary with Austria and further on with the 
13
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Central  and Western  European gas  markets  –  to  reduce 
EU’s  dependence  on  Russian  oil  and  gas.  The  pipeline 
length  is  approximately  3,300  km,  starting  at  the 
Georgian/Turkish  and/or  Iranian/Turkish  border 
respectively,  leading  to  Baumgarten  in  Austria.  In  this 
respect it has to be taken into account that a reasonable 
amount of the gas volumes, reaching Baumgarten, have to 
be further transported through Austria to the Central and 
Western European Countries. According to market studies 
the pipeline has been designed to transport  a maximum 
amount  of  31  bcm/year.  Estimated  investment  costs, 
including  financing  costs,  for  a  complete  new  pipeline 
system amount to approximately €7.9 billion. The project is 
developed  by  the  Nabucco  Gas  Pipeline  International 
GmbH.  The  shareholders  of  the  company  are:  OMV 
(Austria),  MOL (Hungary),  Transgaz (Romania),  Bulgargaz 
(Bulgaria),  BOTAŞ (Turkey),  and  RWE  (Germany)  each 
having 16.67 percent of the shares.1 Recently, The United 
Arab Emirates' Crescent petroleum, and Austria's OMV and 
Hungary's  MOL  ,  formed  a  consortium  to  pump  over  3 
billion  cubic  feet  per  day  of  gas  from  Iraq's  Kurdistan 
region via the Nabucco pipeline project to supply Europe 
(http://www.nabucco-
pipeline.com/company/shareholders7/table-of-content-
shareholder.html). 
Turkey’s geopolitics is also important for future success of 
EU’s neighborhood policy (ENP) in the Caucasus.  Recent 
conflict between Georgia and Russia showed how volatile 
this  region  remains.   When  one  also  considers  the 
stalemate between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-
Karabakh,  the need for  further  cooperation  between EU, 
Russia,  and  Turkey  becomes  all  the  more  important. 
Regional stability and Turkey’s role in the Caucasus will be 
discussed in the next chapter but it is important to note 
the policies of the EU in this region that stand to benefit 
from Turkey’s full partnership.  The ENP aims to bring EU’s 
new neighbors closer to the Union through economic and 
political cooperation and covers the Mediterranean Basin, 
Eastern  Europe  and  the  Caucasus.  Armenia,  Azerbaijan, 
and Georgia are included in the program.  Furthermore, the 
EU maintains a monitoring force in Georgia following this 
country’s  war  with  Russia.  This  has  been  the  fastest 
deployment  of  a  mission;  the  EU  has  ever  done  in  its 
history. 
14
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All  of these factors show how smooth functioning of EU-
NATO partnership is essential for success of CSDP. In that 
regard, Turkey’s membership would significantly improve 
EU’s policy objectives. First, Turkey will  strengthen CSDP 
with  its  considerable  military  capabilities  and  improve 
partnership with NATO. Second, given the fact that Turkey 
serves as an energy corridor for Europe for carrying oil and 
natural gas from the Caspian Sea basin and Central Asia, 
its membership could also strengthen EU’s energy security. 
And third, Turkey’s membership will go long way in settling 
Greek-Turkish problems – including Cyprus.  Yet, despite all 
the above mentioned realities full partnership between EU-
Turkey in defense matters, and thus between CSDP-NATO, 
remain  unattainable  due  to  interlocking  of  at  least  four 
issues:  (1) Cyprus problem and how Greek Cypriots try to 
hold Turkey hostage in this country’s accession talks; (2) 
Opposition  of  some  EU  member  states  to  Turkey’s 
membership  in  the  EU as  well  as  in  CSDP;  (3)  Turkey’s 
retaliation  to  these  by  asserting  its  veto  over  Cyprus’s 
participation  in  NATO’s  Partnership  for  Peace  (PfP)  and 
NATO’s  decision-making  mechanism;  and  (4)  Turkey’s 
demand for EU to deliver its promises to Turkish Cypriots 
following their vote for the 2004 Annan Peace Plan.6 The 
6 UN Secretary General Kofi Annan called upon the international community to eliminate 
economic restrictions and barriers on the Turkish Cypriots and this was echoed by former 
U.S.  Secretary  of  State  Colin  Powell  and  EU Commissioner  Verheugen,  British  Prime 
Minister Tony Blair, and the EU Council of Ministers (prior to enlargement) (International 
Crisis Group, 2006:12). Several reasons stood behind this call.  First, the international 
community felt obligated to compensate the Turkish Cypriots, who despite their positive 
vote,  would be excluded from the benefits  of EU accession. Second, as noted by the 
International  Crisis  Group  (ibid)  “since  the  Turkish  Cypriot  unilateral  declaration  of 
independence in 1983, the international community has adhered to UN Security Council 
Resolutions  541  (1983)  and  550  (1984),  which  called  upon  states  not  to  assist  the 
secession  of  northern  Cyprus.  Normalising  the  economic  situation  in  the  north  was 
viewed as a form of assistance to secession.”  As far as Kofi Annan was concerned, the 
Turkish Cypriots’ vote for reunification invalidated the political  logic of isolation.  And 
third, lifting the isolation was viewed as a catalyst for reunification as it would initiate 
economic development of the north and bridge the gap between the two sides. In the UN 
Security Council, Annan’s Cyprus report met Russian opposition and never reached a full  
hearing.  In the EU, the situation was even more precarious. Prior to the referendum, EU 
officials promised to reward the Turkish Cypriots if they voted in favor of the Annan Plan. 
Following the Greek Cypriots’ rejection, Enlargement Commissioner Gunter Verhuegen 
went  even  further  and  presented  a  scathing  criticism of  President  Papadopoulos  for 
hijacking the EU process and for wanting to use the EU membership to pressure the 
Turkish side to cave in to Greek Cypriot wishes.  Similar statements followed from the 
president of the European Parliament.  In an attempt to reward the Turkish side for its  
endorsement of the Annan Plan, the Brussels Commission prepared a policy package 
that would have established direct trade between north Cyprus and EU markets and also 
provided for 249 million euros in direct aid.  Verhuegen argued that “I  am making a 
serious call on our member states to make a decision to stick to their promises [to the 
Turkish Cypriots],” adding that the European Commission had done, and was willing to 
do,  everything  it  could  to  back  the  Turkish  Cypriots  (Bahceli,  September  14,  2004). 
Despite such good will, the efforts of the Commission failed in both tasks as the Council 
of Ministers ruled that the plans violated existing EU regulations since north Cyprus could 
not be viewed as separate legal territory from member state Cyprus.  Therefore, all EU 
linkages  to  the  Turkish  side  of  the  island  would  have  to  go  through  the  official 
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challenge for policy makers is how to delink these matters 
and overcome the problems.
As a result of these challenges, Turkey is excluded from full 
participation in CFSP/CSDP, which in turn, demonstrates its 
trump card  in  EU-NATO partnership.   The nature  of  this 
problem,  however,  is  not  something that  emerged since 
Cyprus’s  membership  in  the  EU  in  2004.   The  problem 
emerged at the time when EU moved to implement  “Berlin 
Plus”  arrangements,  which  received  support  from  the 
United States, that called for NATO to provide equipment 
and intelligence for the European-only missions as long as 
the  former  did  not  undermine  the  Atlantic  alliance  by 
creating its own bureaucracy and independent capabilities 
(Economist, December 9, 2000, p. 56). This was in line with 
government of Cyprus – which the Turkish Cypriots object. Despite its good intentions 
aimed at rewarding Turkish Cypriots, the EU met legal and administrative obstacles in its  
efforts.  The initial plan of Verhuegen was to find a formula for providing direct economic 
aid  and  establishing  direct  trade  with  the  North.   The  proposed  plan  would  have 
permitted  tariff  free  trade  between  the  EU  and  north  Cyprus  (for  goods  wholly  or 
substantially produced in the north).  In order to accomplish this goal, the Commission 
argued  that  the  existing  problem  of  “origin  certificates,”  which  the  Greek  Cypriots 
successfully  argued in  the  ECJ  decision  of  1994,  could  be  overcome by  recognizing 
certificates issued by the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce since this institution 
was established under the 1960 arrangement that created the Republic of Cyprus. The 
Commission based its argument behind Article 133 of the EU Treaty that regulates trade 
with third parties (territories) and is also used to regulate trade with territories that are 
part of an EU member state but are not included in its customs territory, such as Ceuta  
and Melilla (Ibid). They had hoped to argue that, in lieu of referendum results and the 
Council’s call for ending economic isolation of Turkish Cypriots, north Cyprus presented 
such a territory.   However,  the Greek Cypriots argued that  the regulation fell  under 
Protocol  10  of  the  Accession  Treaty  (which  addressed  the  particulars  of  the  Cyprus 
problem and its linkage to accession).  As the Protocol stipulates, partial lifting of the 
suspension of the acquis to the north requires unanimity in the Council.  The legal office 
of the Council supported this interpretation.  The outcome of these interpretations has 
been devastating to the original intent of the Commission.  Gradually, those members of 
the EU that wanted to see through the Commission’s goal one by one withdrew their  
efforts and accepted the legal impasse.  The Luxembourg, UK, and German presidencies 
pushed very hard to break Cyprus’s opposition to the plan.  In each case, they met Greek 
Cypriot veto and decided to separate economic aid package from direct trade/air link 
with the north.  The Greek Cypriots even won a cheap victory in the aid package by 
demanding “the passage of the aid regulation be tied to a more restrictive interpretation 
by  the  Commission  of  the  trade  regulation’s  likely  remit.  When  a  draft  of  the 
Commission’s proposed explanatory text reached the Turkish Cypriots, they declared it 
unacceptable, and the process again collapsed, this time with the loss of €120m of the 
€259m package thanks to the ending of the 2005 financial year. The aid regulation was 
eventually passed on 27 February 2006, with no explanatory declaration attached.” (Ibid: 
13). With success in this area, the Greek Cypriots moved diligently to block many other 
attempts of Turkish Cypriots with EU institutions that included exclusion of universities of 
north Cyprus from participating in the Erasmus program (Turkish Cypriot dailies). In a 
similar  fashion,  an air  link  between  north  Cyprus and the  rest  of  the  world  (except 
Turkey)  cannot be established as long as international  conventions and the UN view 
Greek Cypriot government as the legitimate representative of Cyprus. Short of the UN 
Security Council’s future resolution that would lift economic isolation of the north, direct 
air flights to airports in TRNC cannot be established.  Thus, EU countries have been gun 
shy in taking steps to establish such air links with the north. The above situation creates 
a major embarrassment for the EU as it finds itself in a quandary.  On the one hand, it  
wants to fulfil its promise to Turkish Cypriots.  On the other hand, it finds its hands tied 
by legal issues and Greek Cypriot (and probably Greece) veto. In the meantime, the EU 
principles of fairness and justice remain unfulfilled as far as Turkish Cypriots and their 
supporters in the EU are concerned.  
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EU’s deepening of regional integration in matters that fell 
outside the typical economic affairs. At that time, Turkey 
being left out of the accession talks at the Nice summit, 
feared that anything short of  being included in the CSDI 
decision-making mechanism (even when NATO troops are 
not  needed)  would  simply  result  in  Turkey  becoming 
further  distanced  from  Europe.  At  the  NATO  foreign 
ministers’  meeting  in  Brussels  on  December  14,  2000, 
Turkey refused to give the EU, which it  is  trying to join, 
assured access  to NATO’s  planning skills  for  missions  in 
which NATO as a whole is not involved.
The solution to the Turkish veto emerged, known as the 
Ankara Agreement, after an extensive British campaign, in 
which Turkey received assurances from NATO that the new 
EU force would not be used against Turkey’s geographic 
and  security  interests.  The  new agreement  required  EU 
approval,  but  before it  got  to the next  stage ran into  a 
Greek objection at the Seville summit in June 2002. The 
matter  was  settled  at  the  December  2002  summit  in 
Copenhagen where the EU and NATO agreed to “effective 
mutual  consultation,  equality  and  due  regard  for  the 
decision-making autonomy of the EU and NATO, respect for 
the interests of the EU and NATO members states, respect 
for  the  principles  of  the  Charter  of  the  United  Nations, 
coherent,  transparent  and  mutually  reinforcing 
development  of  the  military  capability  requirements 
common  to  the  two  organizations”  (NATO, 
http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-eu/policy.html).  Following 
this political decision of the leaders, the two sides adopted 
the “Berlin Plus” arrangements of March 17, 2003, which 
provide  the  basis  for  NATO–EU  cooperation  in  crisis 
management by allowing EU access to NATO’s collective 
assets  and  capabilities  for  EU-led  operations.  These 
arrangements allow NATO to support EU-led operations in 
which the alliance as a whole might not be involved. The 
specifics  of  the  Berlin  Plus  arrangements  include  the 
following:
1.  NATO–EU Security Agreement (covers the exchange 
of  classified  information  under  reciprocal  security 
protection rules);
2. Assured  EU access  to  NATO’s  planning  capabilities 
for actual use in the military planning of EU–led crisis 
management operations;
3. Presumed  availability  of  NATO  capabilities  and 
common  assets,  such  as  communication  units  and 
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headquarters  for  EU-led  crisis  management 
operations;
4. Procedures for release, monitoring, return, and recall 
of NATO assets and capabilities;
5. Terms of reference for NATO’s Deputy SACEUR—who 
in principle will  be the operation commander of an 
EU-led  operation  under  the  “Berlin  Plus” 
arrangements (and who is always a European)—and 
European command options for NATO;
6. NATO–EU consultation arrangements  in the context 
of  an  EU-led  crisis  management  operation  making 
use of NATO assets and capabilities;
7. Incorporation within NATO’s long-established defense 
planning  system,  of  the  military  needs  and 
capabilities that may be required for EU-led military 
operations, thereby ensuring the availability of well-
equipped forces trained for either NATO-led or EU-led 
operations. (Ibid.)
With  the  above  agreements,  the  EU–NATO  partnership 
entered a new chapter of full cooperation that can address 
security  challenges  on  the  EU’s  periphery. However,  as 
soon  as  this  agreement  was  reached,  new  challenges 
emerged that would test the partnership.  France tried to 
negate Berlin Plus in a couple of ways.  First, the French 
tried  to  create  a  separate  military  headquarters  even 
though the agreement allowed access to NATO’s command 
structure. Second, France initiated an ESDP (CSDP) mission 
in  Congo that included Canada but did not  seek U.S.  or 
NATO approval.  Through this action, the French sought to 
negate any notion of NATO’s right of first refusal to such 
operations (Anderson 2008: 98-99). This was followed by a 
decision  between  Belgium,  France,  Germany,  and 
Luxembourg  (known  as  the  Tervuren  Four)  to  seek  the 
creation of a new EU defense headquarters near Brussels. 
Initially,  the  UK distanced  itself  from this  idea  but  soon 
decided to join in arguing that a growing EU needed such 
an institution for coordination purposes.  
Other  problems  in  the  CSDP–NATO  partnership  revolved 
around duplication of Rapid Deployment Forces (RDF) and, 
as noted above, Turkey’s refusal to permit participation of 
Cyprus and Malta (until recently) in NATO–CSDP meetings 
and operations.  Turkey’s arguments against closer military 
links with the EU rest on a technicality (namely that two 
non-NATO EU member-states,  Cyprus and Malta,  did  not 
have  an  agreement  with  NATO  on  protecting  classified 
information).  But  it  was  widely  understood  that  Turkey 
opposed  close  NATO  links  with  the  EU  as  a  way  of 
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punishing  the  Union  for  having  admitted  Cyprus  while 
dragging its feet on Turkey’s  membership application and 
also  degrading  Turkey’s  role  in  decision  making 
mechanism of the WEU (now absorbed into CFSP/CSDP).
At  the  September  2002  NATO  summit  in  Prague,  US 
secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld proposed creation of 
a  NATO RDF composed of  21,000 troops  coming mostly 
from  European  members  of  the  organization  to  defend 
against nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. France 
insisted on the establishment of a separate European RDF 
for  two  reasons.  First  was  the  French  determination  to 
establish  a  European  force  that  was  separate  from 
participating countries’ NATO commitments.  Second, the 
European  RDF  was  necessary  if  it  were  to  involve 
participation of non-NATO EU states like Cyprus and Malta, 
which are kept out of  NATO–ESDP operations by Turkey. 
This position of the Turks angered the French, who insist 
that  EU means  the  presence of  all  member  states.  Yet, 
everyone  in  the  EU  knew  that  Europe  did  not  have 
sufficient troops to fulfill all its peacekeeping commitments 
and  its  need  to  access  NATO’s  strategic  and  heavy  lift 
capabilities.   Moreover,  the  EU  was  already  relying  on 
Turkey’s  assistance  in  some  of  its  operations  in  the 
Balkans:   EUPM in  Bosnia-Herzegovina,  Concordia  in  the 
FYROM, and Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  
Today,  Canada, Iceland,  Norway, Turkey,  and the United 
States,  which  are  members  of  NATO but  not  of  the  EU, 
participate in all NATO-EU meetings. So do Austria, Finland, 
Ireland,  Sweden,  and  since  2008,  Malta,  which  are 
members of the EU and PfP program (NATO, “NATO-EU: A 
Strategic  Partnership”  http://www.nato.int/ 
cps/en/natolive/topics_49217.htm).  Cyprus  which  is  not  a  PfP 
member  and  does  not  have  a  security  agreement  with 
NATO  on  the  exchange  of  classified  documents,  cannot 
participate in official  NATO-EU meetings.  Participation of 
Cyprus  is  also  vetoed  by  Turkey.  Figure  4  shows  the 
overlapping  memberships  of  EU  and  non-EU  NATO 
countries.
Figure 4: Transatlantic and Other Affiliated Countries Overlapping 
Defense Commitments
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Source:  IISS, European Military Capabilitites, p.3.
The bottom line of all this web of overlapping preferences 
is that as long as the Cyprus problem remains and Greek 
Cypriots continue to threaten to block Turkey membership 
as  a  means  of  obtaining  concessions  from  the  Turks, 
resolution of the above PfP standoff is highly unlikely.  For 
sure, Cyprus is an insignificant addition to PfP in terms of 
military contribution. Moreover, when compared with what 
resources  countries  bring  to  the  table  for  CSDP-NATO 
partnership,  Cyprus  is  nothing  more  than  a  midget. 
However, this Island presents a valuable real estate for EU-
NATO security in the eastern Mediterranean.  Furthermore, 
supporters of Cyprus in the EU maintain that this country’s 
participation  in  PfP  is  a  necessary  step  in  thorough 
integration of this country in CFSP/CSDP.  Turkey, on the 
other hand, firmly opposes Cyprus’s accession to PfP and 
Greek Cypriot inclusion in NATO’s decision-making process. 
This  tit-for-tat  scenario  presents  nothing  less  than  a 
frustration to other EU members and the US and threatens 
to escalate already high tensions between EU and Turkey.
Conclusions and Prospects
Despite  complex  interwoven  interests  of  competing 
parties, all is not lost in finding a way out of the current 
stalemate.  One way out of this dilemma is to consider an 
associate membership for Turkey in CSDP prior to full EU 
membership. Of course, this option also carries the risk of 
setting  precedence  in  EU-Turkey  relations  that  could  be 
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used  by  some  member  states  as  the  validation  of 
“privileged partnership” for Turkey. Of all countries in the 
EU, and to everyone’s surprise, France has begun talking 
to its EU partners about giving associate membership to 
Turkey in CSDP. This is quite a turnabout for France but, as 
a  known  skeptic  of  Turkey’s  EU  membership,  France  is 
probably  the  only  major  EU  member  state  that  could 
convince other reluctant members to agree. The sensitive 
issues would be the delinking of associate membership in 
CSDP with privileged partnership and making sure there is 
no surprise veto by Cyprus.
Another option is to consider trade offs that could resolve 
the stalemate.  In exchange to Turkey’s lifting of its veto 
over Cyprus’s participation in PfP and EU-NATO decision-
making  mechanism,  the  Greek  Cypriots  and  their  EU 
supporters could permit direct economic and political link 
between  the  Union  and  Turkish  Cypriots.   Of  course,  it 
could be even better if this also included lifting of objection 
to Turkey’s accession by some EU countries.
Unless creative thinking overtakes current mindset in this 
EU-NATO-Cyprus-Turkey network, it is highly unlikely that 
Transatlantic  Alliance  would  attain  its  optimum  level  of 
collaboration  in  a  changing  world  with  dramatic 
consequences.   EU’s  periphery  is  not  getting  any  more 
stable.
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